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CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
Of all the types of evidence with which a defense 
counsel must deal, character evidence may be the 
most difficult and dangerous- 11difficult" because of 
the complexity of rules governing this area of Jaw and 
"dangerous" because of the potential impact that 
evidence of bad character may have on the jury. This 
article examines the Ohio rules governing character 
evidence. 
CIRCUMSTANTIAl USE 
Evidence of a person's character is used circum-
stantially in most criminal cases. For example, a per-
son's character for honesty would be circumstantially 
relevant if that person were charged with theft. The 
argument would be as follows: A person with an hon-
est character tends to act in conformity with that 
criminal trials is the rule prohibiting the prosecution 
from introducing evidence of the defendant's bad 
character in its case in chief. It has long been the rule 
in Ohio that in lla criminal prosecution, until a defen-
dant offers evidence of his general good character or 
reputation, the state may not offer testimony of his 
bad character or bad reputation ... " State v. Coch-
rane, 151 Ohio St. 128, 84 N.E.2d 742 (1949)(sylla-
bus 3); accord, State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 
~ character and thus is less likely to steal than a person 1 with a bad character for honesty. Of course, the argu-
ment cuts both ways. A person with a bad character 
for honesty tends to act in conformity with that 
character and thus is more likely to steal than a per-
son with an honest character. The circumstantial use 
of character is sometimes known as 11propensity" or 
~~disposition" evidence. 
402, 358 N.E.2d 623, 630 (1976); State v. Marko-
witz, 138 Ohio St. 106, 33 N.E.2d 1 (1941); Sabo v . 
State, 119 Ohio St. 231, 163 N.E. 28 (1928); Hamil-
ton v. State, 34 Ohio St. 82 (1877); Griffin v. State, 
140hioSt. 55 (1862);Statev. Pigott, 1 OhioApp.2d 
22, 197 N.E.2d 911 (1964). It is also error for the 
prosecution to comment on the defendant's failure to 
introduce evidence of good character. State v. Marko-
witz, 138 Ohio St. 106,33 N.E.2d 1 (1941). 
The prohibition against the use of character evi-
dence, however, is not absolute. There are three im-
portant exceptions: 
(1) A defendant may introduce evidence of 
his good character, and if he does, the prosecu-
tion may introduce rebuttal evidence of bad 
character. While character evidence has some probative value, 
the courts have generally excluded this type of evi-
dence because 11 it comes with too much dangerous 
baggage of prejudice, distraction from the issues, time 
consumption, and hazard of surprise." C. McCormick, 
Evidence 445 (2d ed. 1972). See State v. Lytle, 48 
Ohio St.2d 391, 402, 358 N.E.2d 623, 630 (1976) 
(
11 Although character is not irrelevant, the danger of 
prejudice outweighs the probative value of such evi-
dence."). As one commentator has noted, the exclu-
sion of character evidence 11 implements the philo-
sophy that a defendant should not be convicted be-
cause he is an unsavory person, nor because of past 
misdeeds, but only becau!ie of his guilt of the particu-
lar crime charged." 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 
Federal Evidence 79 (1978). 
The most important application of this principle in 
Public Defender: Hyman Friedman 
(2) A defendant may introduce evidence of 
the victim's character under some circumstances. 
(3) Either side may introduce evidence of a 
witness' character for truth and veracity in order 
to impeach that witness. 
In addition, acts which may incidentally evidence bad 
character may be offered for other purposes- for ex-
ample, to show motive, identity, lack of knowledge 
or accident. Before discussing these issues in detail, it 
is important to consider how character may be 
proved. 
METHODS OF PROOF 
A person's character could be proved by evidence 
of reputation, opinion, or specific acts. 
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Reputation 
Reputation evidence is the most common method 
of establishing character. Typically, a witness familiar 
with the defendant's reputation concerning a particu-
lar character trait testifies about that reputation. 
Reputation therefore is not synonymous with charac-
ter; it is only one method of proving character. 
"There is no doubt that counsel and even courts have 
sometimes forgetfully treated character and reputa-
tion as synonymous . . . Character of a person is that 
which he really is, rather than what he is reputed to 
be ... " State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 53, 82 
N.E. 969 (1907). The Ohio cases permit the use of 
reputation evidence to prove character. E.g., State v. 
Elliott, 25 Ohio St.2d 249, 267 N.E.2d 806 (1971 ), 
· vacated on other grounds,· 408 U.S. 939 ( 1972); State 
v, Cochrane, 151 Ohio St. 128,84 N.E.2d 742 
(1949). See also Ohio Jury Instructions- Criminal 
411.05 (Provisional 1974). 
The offering party, however, must lay a proper 
foundation establishing the witness' qualifications to 
testify about a person's reputation in the community; 
"The preliminary qualifications of the [character] 
witness must be such as to advise the court and the 
jury that he has the means of knowing such general 
reputation of the [person] in the community ... " 
Radke v. State, 107 Ohio St. 399, 140 N.E. 586 
(1923) (syllabus 1 ). In addition, the "community" 
may not be too "remote" - in a place "where he has 
never lived, and where he is not shown to be generally 
known or acquainted ... " Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio 
St. 55 (1862) (syllabus 5). 
Opinion Evidence 
Character could be proved also by opinion evi-
dence. For example, a witness who is sufficiently ac-
quainted with the defendant could give his opinion of 
the defendant's character. The courts, however, have 
generally excluded opinion evidence. See C. McCor-
mick, Evidence 443 ( 2d ed. 1972). 
The Ohio cases are not clear on this issue. When 
used for impeachment, character may only be proved 
by reputation, not opinion, evidence. Cowan v. Kin-
ney, 33 Ohio St. 422 (1878); Bucklin v. State, 20 
Ohio 18 ( 1851 ). When used on the merits to show 
the defendant's character, however, the same rule has 
not been applied consistently. In an early case, Gan-
dolfo v. State, 11 Ohio St. 114 (1860), the Ohio 
Supreme Court authorized the use of opinion evi-
dence: 
A defendant who ... is entitled to give evidence of his 
character for peace and quietness, is not limited to 
proving what people may have said of him ... but is en-
titled to inquire as to his character from those acquaint-
ed with him, and they are authorized to speak from his 
general peaceable and quiet conduct ... /d. at 114 
(syllabus 3). 
Gandolfo was subsequently followed in State. v. 
Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34,82 N.E. 969 (1907), in 
which the Court stated: 
[W] e think the accused is not confined to his reputation 
for a certain trait of character involved in the charge, but 
may, by those most intimate with him during a course 
of years, spread before the jury his real self, touching 
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the quality of conduct involved in the issue. Such 
familiar and intimate acquaintance may enable his 
neighbors to read him as they would a familiar book. 
/d. at 53-54, 82 N.E. at 971 (emphasis added). 
See also Saba v. State, 119 Ohio St. 231, 239-40, 163 
N.E. 28, 31 (1928); State v. Roberts, 71 Ohio Abs. 
443, 448 (Ct. App. 1955); Gibbs v. State, 7 Ohio Abs. 
374, 375 (Ct. App. 1929). 
Although neither Gandolfo nor Dickerson have ever 
been overruled, later cases apparently assumed only 
reputation evidence is permitted. In fact, the Com-
ment to the Ohio Jury Instruction on character 
states; "Evidence of character must be confined to 
general reputation." Ohio Jury Instructions- Crim-
inal 411.05 (Provisional 1974). The case cited for 
that proposition, however, specifically rejects proof 
by specific acts but not opinion evidence. See State 
v. Elliott, 25 Ohio St.2d 249, 253, 267 N.E.2d 806, 
809 ( 1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 939 
(1972). 
Proposed Ohio Rule of Evidence 405(A), 51 Ohio 
B. 186 (1978), would permit the use of opinion 
evidence. This follows Federal Rule 405(a) and is 
supported by the commentators. See C. McCormick, 
Evidence 455-56 (2d ed. 1972); 7 J. Wigmore, Evi-
dence§ 1986 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). 
Evidence of Specific Acts 
A third way of proving character would be by in-
troducing evidence of specific acts. For example, 
evidence that a person stole money on a previous oc-
casion would be relevant in ascertaining that person's 
character for honesty. Although evidence of specific 
acts may be the strongest evidence of character, the 
courts have generally excluded this method of proof. 
See State v. Cochrane, 151 Ohio St. 128, 134, 84 
N.E.2d 742, 745 (1949); Hamilton v. State, 34 Ohio 
St. 82, 86 (1877); Griffin v. State, 140hio St. 55, 
63 (1862). The rationale for this prohibition was 
commented upon in State v. Elliott, 25 Ohio St.2d 
249,267 N.E.2d 806 (1971), vacated on other 
grounds, 408 U.S. 939 (1972): "The admission of 
such evidence would raise collateral issues and divert 
the minds of the jurors from the matter at hand. It is 
manifestly unfair to compel a party to defend specific 
acts alleged as proof of bad reputation or character 
... " /d. at 253, 267 N.E.2d at 809 (1971). There is, 
however, an important exception in Ohio. R.C. 
2945.56 permits the prosecution to rebut evidence of 
good character by introducing evidence of a defend-
ant's "previous conviction of a crime involving moral 
turpitude ... " 
EXCEPTION FOR DEFENDANT'S CHARACTER 
The first exception to the general prohibition 
against the use of character evidence is that the de-
fendant may introduce evidence of his own good 
character. Typically, the defendant presents such 
evidence by calling witnesses to testify as to his repu-
tation in the community. In some cases the impact 
of character evidence may be critical. As the U.S. 
Supreme Court has commented: "The circumstances 
may be such that an established reputation for good 
character, if it is relevant to the issue, would alone 
create a reasonable doubt, although without it the 
other evidence would be convincing." Edgington v. 
U.S., 164 U.S. 361, 366 (1896). Accord, Michelson v. 
U.S., 335 U.S. 469,476 (1948) ("[S] uch testimony 
alone, in some circumstances, may be enough to raise 
a reasonable doubt of guilt ... "). 
Relevant Character Trait 
The character trait proffered must be relevant to 
the offense charged. For example, in Booker v. State, 
33 Ohio App. 338, 169 N.E. 588 (1929), a defendant 
charged with unlawful possession of intoxicating 
liquor was precluded from introducing character evi-
dence because it was not relevant. The court stated: 
In showing his character, however, [the defendant] is 
confined to that trait of character that is inconsistent 
with guilt of the offense charged in the indictment. The 
accused in this case attempted to qualify a witness to 
testify to the general reputation of the accused for truth 
and veracity .... Such a reputation might properly be 
shown in a case of perjury, but it is not a trait involved 
in unlawful possession of liquor. He then attempted to 
qualify a witness as to the 'general reputation ... for 
being a peaceable, quiet, law-abiding citizen.' Objection 
was made .... The court sustained this objection, ob-
serving that the crime charged was not one of violence, 
and in this the court was right, for it is of course true 
that bootlegging may be both peaceable and quiet /d. 
at 341-42, 169 N.E. at 590. 
The Ohio Supreme Court has also recognized this 
point. 
The general character which is the proper subject of in-
quiry should also have reference to the nature of the 
charge against the defendant. Thus, in the present case, 
the defendant being charged with a crime necessarily im-
porting dishonesty, called witnesses who gave evidence 
tending to show a general good character for honesty. 
Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio 55, 63 (1862). 
See also Sabo v. State, 119 Ohio St. 231,239, 163 
N.E. 28, 31 {1928) ("In a murder case, such reputa-
tion must relate to his being a peaceable, law-abiding 
citizen"). Both Sabo and Booker authorize the use 
of the general character trait bf being a "law-abiding" 
citizen. 
Number of Witnesses 
Although R.C. 2945.57 places some conditions on 
the number of character witnesses that may be called, 
a trial court may not unreasonably limit the number 
of character witnesses that a defendant may offer. 
State v. Carter, 75 Ohio App. 545, 58 N.E.2d 794 
( 1944) (error to exclude 3 character witnesses after 5 
character witnesses had already testified). 
Prosecutorial Response 
By introducing evidence of his own character, the 
defendant, in the words of Justice Jackson, may 
"open(] a veritable Pandora's box ... " Michelson v. 
U.S., 335 U.S. 469,480 (1948). This is because once 
character is introduced, the prosecutor can respond in 
two ways. First, the prosecutor may cross-examine ~ the character witnesses about prior incidents in the 
defendant's past. Second, the prosecution may offer 
evidence of the defendant's bad character in rebuttal. 
Thu_s, what the prosecution is forbidden to do in its 
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case in chief, it may do in rebuttal. 
Cross-Examination. The prosecution is permitted 
to test the witness' qualifications to testify about the 
defendant's character. For example, in State v. 
Elliott, 25 Ohio St.2d 249, 267 N.E.2d 806 (1971), 
vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 939 (1972), the 
prosecution asked defense character witnesses wheth-
er they had heard about a felonious assault commit-
ted by the defendant on a ten-year-old girl. In up-
holding this type of cross-examination, the Court 
stated: 
A character witness may be cross-examined as to the 
existence of reports of particular acts, vices, or associa-
tions of the person concerning whom he has testified 
which are inconsistent with the reputation attributed to 
him by the witness - not to establish the truth of the 
facts, but to test the credibility of the witness, and to 
ascertain what weight or value is to be given his testi-
mony. Such inconsistent testimony tends to show 
either that the witness is unfamiliarwith the reputation 
concerning which he has testified, or that his standards 
of what constitutes good repute are unsound. /d. (syl-
labus 2) 
The Court cited Michelson v. U.S., 335 U.S. 469 
(1948), the leading case on this subject. Michelson 
was charged with bribing an IRS agent. The U.S. 
Supreme Court permitted the prosecutor to ask 
whether the defense character witnesses had "heard" 
about the defendant's 20-year-old conviction for a 
trademark violation and 27-year-old arrest for receiv-
ing stolen property. Although such questions are not 
supposed to be used as evidence of the defendant's 
bad character, that in all probability is how the jury 
will use the information, notwithstanding a limiting 
instruction. This possibility alone cautions against 
the use of character evidence unless defense counsel is 
positive his client in fact has an unimpeachable char-
acter. 
The prosecution's ability to cross-examine in this 
manner is not without limitations. The possibility of 
abuse has been recognized by both commentators and 
courts. Wigmore wrote: 
This method of inquiry or cross-examination is frequent-
ly resorted to by counsel for the very purpose of injuring 
by indirection a character which they are forbidden 
directly to attack in that way; they rely upon the mere 
putting of the question (not caring that it is answered 
negatively) to convey their covert insinuation. The 
value of the inquiry for testing purposes is often so small 
and the opportunities of its abuse by underhand ways 
are so great that the practice may amount to little more 
than a mere subterfuge, and should be strictly super-
vised by forbidding it to counsel who do not use it in 
good faith. 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence 921 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1970). 
The Michelson Court also commented that this type 
of cross-examination placed a "heavy responsibility 
on trial courts to protect the practice from any mis-
use." 335 U.S. at 480. The Court went on to point 
out that the trial judge in that case 
took pains to ascertain, out of presence of the jury, that 
the target of the question was an actual event, which 
would probably result in some comment among ac-
quaintances if not injury to the defendant's reputation. 
He satisfied himself that counsel was not merely taking 
a random shot a( a reputation imprudently exposed or 
asking a groundless question to waft an unwarranted in-
. nuendo into the jury box. /d. at 481. 
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court in Elliott re-
marked: "If the defendant had never been convicted 
of a felonious assault, such question by the prosecu-
tor, being made in bad faith, would be the predicate 
for error .... " 267 N.E.2d at 809. Thus, once the 
prosecution begins such an inquiry, defense counsel 
should request a side-bar conference and demand that 
the prosecution establish the basis for the question. 
See also C. McCormick, Evidence 458 (2d ed. 1972). 
There are additional limitations on the prosecutor's 
cross~e:xamiiiatiori~ Only acts which would affect the 
particular character trait offered by the defendant can 
properly be raised on cross-examination. For-exam-
ple, if the character witness testifies about the 
defendant'scharacter for honesty, the witness cannot 
be cross-examined about violent acts. This is why 
evidence of general"law-abiding" character should be 
avoided; it gives the prosecutor greater latitude on 
crosscexamination as well as on rebuttal. See Michel-
son at 483-84. In addition, acts which are too remote 
are not the proper subject of cross-examination. The 
27-year-old arrest was admissible in Michelson only 
because "two of [the character] witnesses dated their 
acquaintance with the defendant as commencing 
thirty years before the trial." /d. at 484. 
Rebuttal. Once the defendant introduces evidence 
of his ·character, the prosecution may call its own 
character witnesses in rebuttal. The testimony of the 
rebuttal character witnesses must relate to the charac-
ter trait offered by the defense. With one exception, 
rebuttal is restricted to the use of reputation evidence. 
Stafev. CoC:h-rane, 151 Ohio St. 128, 84 N.E.2d 742 
(1949). The exception is found in R.C. 2945.56 
which provides: "When the defendant offers evidence 
of his character or reputation, the prosecution may 
offer, in rebuttal thereof, proof of his previous con-
viction of a crime involving moral turpitude, in addi-
tion to other competent evidence." 
EXCEPTION FOR CHARACTER OF THE VICTIM 
A second exception to the general prohibition 
against the use of character evidence involves the vic-
tim's character. The victim's character has been ad-
mitted ( 1) on the issue of consent in rape cases and 
(2) ·on the issue of self-defense in homicide cases. 
Rape Cases 
Under the common law, a rape defendant could in-
troduce evidence of the victim's character for chas-
tity. See McDermott v. State, 13 Ohio St. 332 
(1862); McCombsv. State, 8 Ohio St. 643 (1858). 
This rule rested on the assumption that a woman who 
had consented to premarital or extramarital inter-
course was more likely to consent in the future than a 
woman who had not consented to such intercourse. 
In recent years this assumption, along with other as-
pects of rape prosecutions, has been severely criti-
cized. Approximately half the states, including Ohio, 
have responded to this criticism by enacting "shield" 
laws which limit the admissibility of evidence of the 
victim's character. R.C. 2907.02(D) provides: 
Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual 
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activity, opinion evidence of the victi.m's sexual activity, 
and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual activity 
shall not be admitted under this section [rape] unless it 
involves ... the victim's past sexual activity with the 
offender .. . 
Ohio's gross sexual imposition statute contains an 11 
identical provision. See R.C. 2907.05(D). 
The constitutionality of shield laws that preclude 
the defendant from introducing arguably exculpatory 
evidence has been questioned. Two U.S. Supreme 
Court cases- Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), 
and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 ( 1 973) -
are usually cited in support of the defendant's right 
to introduce evidence of the victim's character in at 
least some circumstances. In Davis the Court held 
that a state statute excluding evidence of a juvenile 
conviction (a type of shield law) violated the defend-
ant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under 
the circumstances of that case. In Chambers the 
Court held that the application of state evidentiary 
rules which precluded the defendant from introducing 
critical andreliable defense.evidence violated due 
process. In addition, Congress recognized the force 
of the constitutional argument in recently enacting a 
federal shield law. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 ex-
plicitly recognizes that the admissibility of evidence 
of the victim's past sexual activity may be "constitu-
tionally required." Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1). Cita-
tions to articles discussing the constitutionality of 
shield statutes are found in 22 C. Wright & K. 
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 424-27 
(1978). The Ohio statute is discussed in Comment, 
Ohio's New Rape Law: Does It Protect Complainant 
at the Expense of the Rights of the Accused?, 9 Ak-
ron L. Rev. 337 (1975); Note, Rape Reform Legisla-
tion: Is It the Solution?, 24 Clev. St. L. Rev. 463 
(1975). 
Homicide 
A homicide defendant may introduce evidence of 
the victim's violent character on the issue of self-
defense. The relevance of violent character in this 
context is twofold. First, the defendant may wish to 
show that the victim was the first aggressor- a per-
son with a violent character will tend to act in con-
formity with that character and thus is more likely to 
be the first aggressor than a person with a peaceable 
character. If this is the reason the evidence is offered, 
it does not matter whether the defendant was aware 
of the victim's character at the time of the killing. 
Once the defendant introduces evidence of the vic-
tim's character, the prosecution may offer rebuttal 
evidence. See C. McCormick, Evidence 461-62 (2d 
ed. 1972). 
Second, the victim's violent character may also be 
relevant to show that the defendant reasonably be-
lieved he was in danger of death or grevious bodily in-
jury. This does not involve the circumstantial use of 
character to show the conduct of the victim, but 
rather the state of mind of the defendant. In this 
case, however, the character of the victim must have 
been communicated to the defendant before the fatal 
encounter. Most of the Ohio cases involve this issue. 
See McGawv. State, 123 Ohio St. 196, 174 N.E. 741 
(1931); State v. Roderick, 77 Ohio St. 301, 82 N:E. 
1082 (1907); Upthegrove v~ State, 37 Ohio St. 662 
(1882); Marts v~ State, 26 Ohio St. 162 (1875). 
EXCEPTION FOR CHARACTER OF A WITNESS 
In addition to other methods, such as bias or prior 
inconsistent statements, a witness' character may be 
used to impeach. Only the witness' character for 
truth and veracity is relevant. This use of character 
may be used by either the prosecution or the defense 
and is permitted whenever a witness, including the ac-
cused, takes the stand. The Ohio cases permit the use 
of reputation but not opinion evidence for this pur-
pose. See Cowan v. Kinney, 33 Ohio St. 422 (1878); 
Bucklin v. State, 20 Ohio 18 (1851 ). Specific acts if 
evidenced by a conviction may also be used to im-
peach. See R.C. 2945.42; State v. Murdock, 172 
Ohio St. 221, 174 N.E.2d 543 (1961). Whether spe-
cific acts not resulting in a conviction may be used for 
impeachment is unclear. This topic is examined in 
Giannelli, Credibility of Witnesses, 1 Public Defender 
Reptr. (Dec. 197 8). 
THE SIMILAR ACTS STATUTE 
As discussed above, the circumstantial use of char-
acter is prohibited unless one of the three recognized 
exceptions is applicable. If, however, an act which in-
cidentally evidences character is offered for some pur-
pose other than to prove character, the prohibition 
does not apply. For example, if a person steals a gun 
and later uses that gun to commit a murder, the theft 
may be relevant in the homicide prosecution to show ~ the identity of the murderer. Thus, while the theft in-
cidentally evidences character, it is not being offered 
for that purpose. See State v. Watson, 28 Ohio St.2d 
15,275 N.E.2d 153 (1971). 
R.C. 2945.59, sometimes known as the "similar 
acts" or "other acts" statute, identifies many of the 
issues for which evidence of "other" acts may be ad-
mitted. It provides: 
In any criminal case in which the defendant's motive 
or intent, the absence of mistake or accident on his part, 
or the defendant's scheme, plan, or system in doing an 
act is material, any acts of the defendant which tend to 
show his motive or intent, the absence of mistake or ac-
cident on his part, or the defendant's scheme, plan, or 
system in doing the act in question may be proved, 
whether they are contemporaneous with or prior or sub-
sequent thereto, notwithstanding that such proof may 
show or tend to show the commission of another crime 
by the defendant. 
Although evidence of "other acts" may be relevant to 
show, for example, intent or motive, it is laden with 
the potential of undue prejudice because the jury may 
use the evidence for the impermissible purpose of de-
termining character. This is true notvvithstanding a 
limiting instruction. See Ohio Jury Instructions-
Criminal 405.23 (Provisional 1974). Because of this 
danger, evidence of "other acts" must meet stringent 
standards to gain admissibility. It is admissible only if 
it is "substantially relevant for some purpose other 
than to show a probability that the individual com-
mitted the crime on trial because he is a man of crim-
inal character." State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 
402, 358 N.E.2d 623, 630 (1976). (emphasis added). 
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In addition, the prosecution must offer ~~substantial 
proof" that the defendant committed the prior act. · 
State v. Carter, 26 Ohio St.2d 79, 269 N:E.2d 115 
(1971);Scottv. State, 107 Ohio St. 475,141 N . .E. 19 
(1923). 
Defense counsel should require th!3t the. prosecu-
tion establish, out of the presence Of the jury, that 
evidence of other acts is relevant to a contested issue 
in the case being tried. In other words, such evidence 
is not admissible solely because the prosecutioncan 
identify one of the purposes mentioned in the statute; 
the prosecution must show that the identified pur-
pose is material in that particular case. As one com-
mentator has remarked: "Particularly to be deplored 
is what might be called the 'smorgasbord' approach to 
analysis of other crimes evidence in which the court 
simply serves up a long list of permissible uses without 
any attempt to show how any of them are applicable 
to the case at hand." 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, 
Federal Practice & Procedure 479 (1978). 
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit's decision fn Manning v. 
Rose, 507 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1974), indicates that an 
abuse of such a statute could run afoul of the due 
process clause. Accord, Cunha v. Brewer, 511 F.2d 
894, 900-01 (8th Cir. 1975); Heads v. Beto, 468 F.2d 
240 (5th Cir. 1972); U.S. v. Johnson, 462 F.2d 592 
(3d Cir. 1972); Atwell v. Arkansas, 426 F. 2d 912 
{8th Cir. 1970). 
For an excellent discussion of other acts evidence, 
see 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice & 
Procedure 427-551 (1978). The Ohio statute is dis-
cussed in Herbert & Mount, Ohio's "Similar Acts 
Statute": Its Uses and Abuses, 9 Akron L. Rev. 301 
(1975); Comment, Evidence of Criminal History in 
Ohio Criminal Prosecutions, 15 Wes. Res. L. Rev. 772 
( 1964); R. Markus, Trial Handbook for Ohio Lawyers 
§§ 330, 341 (1973). 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Standing 
At defendants' trial for armed robbery, the prose-
cution offered into evidence a sawed-off rifle and 
shells which police had seized during a search ofa car 
in which defendants were passengers. A motion to 
suppress the rifle and shells, on grounds that the 
search violated the Fourth Amendment was denied by 
the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed because 
the defendants lacked standing to raise Fourth 
Amendment objections. Since they did not own the 
car, the rifle, or the shells, the search did not violate 
their personal rights .. Nor did they have any legiti-
mate expectations of privacy in the searched areas of 
'I 
the automobile, since they were merely passengers. 
In addition, the Court abandoned the "legitimately 
.on premi?t;!s" test of jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 
257 (1960), asthe measure of Fourth Amendment 
rights in favor of the Katz test of a "legitimate expec-
tation of privacy" in the invaded area. Rakas. v. Illi-
nois, 99 S. Ct. 421 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1978). 
Exclusion of Female Jurors 
Petitioner contended that his right to trial by jury 
had been violated because of a Missouri law which 
granted women automatic exemption from jury serv-
ice upon request. Based upon Taylor v. Louisiana, 
419 U.S. 522 (1975), the U.S. Supreme Court held 
"that such systematic exclusion of women which re-
sults in jury venires averaging less than 15% female 
violates the Constitution's fair-cross-section require-
ment." The Court did go on to say, however, "[W] e 
recognize that a State may have an important interest 
in assuring that those members of the family responsi-
ble for the. care of children are available to do so. An 
exemption appropriately tailored to this interest 
would, we think, survive a fair-cross-section chal-
lenge." Duren v. Missouri, 99 S. Ct. 664 (U.S. Sup. 
Ct. 1979). 
Extradition 
After the defendant was arrested in Michigan, 
Arizona charged him with theft, and an arrest warrant 
was issued in Arizona upon "reasonable cause" to be-
lieve he had committed the offense. The Governor of 
Arizona then issued a requisition for the defendant's 
extradition. The Governor of Michigan acted on the 
requ-isition and ordered the defendant's extradition. 
The defendant petitioned for a writ of habeus corpus, 
claiming that the extradition warrant was invalid in 
that it failed to comply with the Uniform Criminal 
Extradition Act. His petition was denied, but the 
Michigan Supreme Court granted review and found 
the extradition order insufficient because it failed to 
show probable cause. The U.S. Supreme Court held 
that under Art. IV,§ 2 of the Constitution, "the 
courts of the asylum state are bound to accept the de-
manding state's judicial determination since the pro-
ceedings of the demanding state are clothed with the 
traditional presumption of regularity ... When a 
neutral judicial officer of the demanding state has de-
termined that probable cause exists, the courts of the 
asylum state are without power to review the deter-
mination . . . [W] e hold that once the governor of 
the asylum state has acted on a requisition for extra-
dition based on the demanding state's judicial deter-
mination that probable cause existed, no further ju-
dicial inquiry may be had on that issue in the asylum 
state." Michigan v. Doran, 99 S. Ct. 530 (U.S. Sup. 
Ct. 1979). .·. 
Search and Seizure 
Police officers stopped the defendant's car for a 
traffic violation. As the officers approached the car, 
the defendant-driver was observed pushing something 
under the front seat. One officer ordered the defend-
ant out of the car, and positioned himself outside the 
vehicle so he could look under the seat. He saw a 
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gun, seized it, and arrested the defendant f9r carrying 
a concealed weapon. At trial, the defendant moved 
to suppress the weapon. The motion was overruled 
and the defendant was convicted. The Ohio Supreme 
Court found the search properly limited to the pur- (~ 
pose of protecting the officer. It upheld the trial -~ 
court on the ground that "the search and seizure of 
the weapon was reasonable in its inception and scope 
[under Terry and Chime!], and therefore consistent 
with the protections guaranteed by the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments." State v. Smith, 56 Ohio 
St.2d 405 ( 1 978). 
Speedy Trial 
R.C. 2945.71(B)(2) provides that a person charged 
with a misdemeanor shall be brought to trial within 
90 days of arrest. Reasonable continuances may be 
granted pursuant to R.C. 2945.72. Because the de-
fendant's tri~l promised to be lengthy, the trial court 
sua sponte set a trial date 123 days beyond this man-
datory time limitation. The Ohio Supreme Court 
found this time extension to be "facially unreason-
able," and looked to whether the record reflected 
sufficient facts to support the continuance. The 
Court held that use of a standardized entry form indi-
cating a crowded docket is insufficient to support the 
continuance. Also, the "fact that a comparatively 
large number of witnesses was expected to be called 
to testify at trial does not indicate such an exception-
al circumstance as to justify the postponement ... " 
Since the sua sponte continuance order was not "sup-
ported by sufficient detail" in the record, the defend-
ant was discharged. Elmwood Place v. Denike, 56 1. 
Ohio St.2d 427 (1978). ·~ 
Speedy Trial 
Under the Ohio speedy trial statutes an accused 
must be brought to trial within 90 days if he is held in 
jail during that period. R.C. 2945.71. In this case 
trial was set for 91 days after the defendant's arrest. 
Such a decision is not within the discretion of the 
trial court. "When a trial date is set beyond the time 
limits of R.C. 2945.71 and the accused does not 
acquiesce in that date but merely fails to object to 
that date, the trial court's action does not constitute 
a continuance pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H)." State v. 
Cutcher, 56 Ohio St.2d 383 ( 1978). 
Speedy Trial 
On appeal, the State argued that the defendant had 
waived his right to speedy trial when his counsel in-
formed the trial court that the defense would be un-
able to proceed with the case until a later time. The 
trial court made no order or entry granting a contin-
uance. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the bur-
den is upon the prosecution and trial court either to 
see that the defendant is given a speedy trial, or to 
grant a continuance with facts demonstrating its 
reasonableness and necessity. State v. Siler, 57 Ohio 
St.2d 1 ( 1979). -
Proof Necessary for Conviction Under Perjury Statute 
Defendants were convicted of giving false testimony 
to a grand jury under R.C. 2921.11. The State's 
evidence merely showed that the defendants had al-
legedly made statements, not under oath, which were 
in conflict with those made under oath. The Ohio 
Supreme Court ruled that such a showing was insuf-
ficient to convict for perjury under R.C. 2921.11. 
"We think it clear that proof of perjury can not be 
made merely by showing a necessary conflict with 
statements not made under oath." State v. Goodin, 
56 Ohio St.2d 438 (1978). 
Withdrawal of Counsel 
When a defendant's appointed counsel files an ap-
plication with an appellate court to withdraw under 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 ( 1967), the request 
must "be accompanied by a brief referring to any-
thing in the record that might arguably support the 
appeal." /d. The Court will then make a full exami-
nation of the record to determine whether the case is 
wholly frivolous. If it is, the Court may grant coun-
sel's request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. In 
this case, the brief filed by the defendant's cbunsel 
failed to comply with the Anders requirement. 
Therefore, the request to withdraw was denied pend-
ing compliance with those obligations. State v. Dun-
can, 57 Ohio App.2d 93 (Cuyahoga Cty. 1978). 
Defendant's Presence at In Camera Proceeding 
At trial, the State sought to introduce testimony 
under R.C. 2945.59 to show other acts tending to 
demonstrate the appellant's identity or scheme, plan 
or system in committing the act in question. The 
defense moved to exclude and the trial court held an a in camera proceeding to determine admissibility. 
Over objection the defendant was not allowed to at-
tend. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant 
had a right to be present during an in camera hearing 
regarding "other acts" testimony. "We find it con-
ceivable that in many situations a defendant's pres-
ence at such a hearing could result in his giving de-
fense counsel information that could lead to the ex-
clusion of such potentially damaging evidence from 
consideration by the triers of fact .. . " State v. 
Howard, 57 Ohio App.2d 1 (Hamilton Cty. 1978). 
Sentencing 
The trial court ordered the defendant, a minor, to 
pay a $500 fine and costs after she was found guilty 
of consuming intoxicating liquor. On appeal, this sen-
tence was found to be contrary to R.C. 2929.22 in 
that the defendant, being indigent, could not pay the 
fine "within the time [30 days] allowed without un-
due hardship .. . " The Court also found that the trial 
judge acted improperly in basing the sentence on his 
belief that the defendant had lied on the stand. "To 
do so is in effect to punish [the defendant] for an of-
fense for which he has been neither charged nor tried 
and to discourage a defendant from exercising his 
right to trial and to testify on his own behalf." State 
v. jeffers, 57 Ohio App.2d 107 (Hamilton Cty. 1978). 
Consecutive Sentences 
Limitations on consecutive terms of imprisonment 
are set forth in R.C. 2929.41(E)(2), which provides 
that such terms "shall not exceed: .... 2) An ag-
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gregate minimum term of fifteen years, when the 
consecutive terms imposed are for felonies other 
than aggravated murder or murder ... " In interpret-
ing this provision, the Court of Appeals considered 
three points. First, this limitation is binding on all 
consecutive terms, not just those imposed at any one 
time or bx_ any one judge. Second, the legislature has 
shown a p~sumption in favor of concurrent sentences 
in R.C. 2929.41(A). Third, R.C. 2901.04 provides 
that Code sections defining penalties "shall be strictly 
construed against the state, and liberally construed in 
favor of the accused." Thus, any ambiguity in the 
provision concerning limitations on consecutive terms 
must be resolved in the defendant's favor. The Court 
concluded that when a consecutive sentence is im-
posed by a different judge after a separate trial, he is 
limited by the aggregate number of 15 years. In this 
case the trial judge erred in sentencing the defendant 
to a term of 5 to 15 years consecutive to sentences of 
7 to 25 years and 5 to 15 years imposed in an earlier 
trial. The judgment must be modified to comply with 
the 15 year aggregate minimum. State v. Wilson, 57 
Ohio App.2d 11 (Hamilton Cty. 1978). 
Preliminary Hearing for Indicted Defendants 
The California Supreme Court has ruled that denial 
of a preliminary hearing deprived indicted defendants 
of equal protection under the California Constitution. 
"[A] defendant charged by indictment is seriously 
disadvantaged in contrast to a defendant charged by 
information .... Indeed, current indictment pro-
cedures create what can only be characterized as a 
prosecutor's Eden; he decides what evidence will be 
heard, how it is to be presented, and then advises the 
grand jury on its admissibility and legal significance. 
In sharp contrast are information procedures in which 
the defendant is entitled to an adversarial, judicial 
hearing that yields numerous protections, including a 
far more meaningful probable cause determination." 
Hawkins v. Superior Court, 24 Crim. L. Rep. 2197 
(Cal. Sup. Ct. 1978). 
Warrant Needed for In-Home Arrest 
The defendant was arrested inside his home for 
murder by police acting without a warrant .. He then 
made a statement admitting the murder which oc-
curred three years earlier. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that "because of the Fourth Amendment 
and the substantial expectation of privacy in one's 
home, an arrest warrant is required to validly arrest 
someone in his home unless exigent circumstances 
exist to justify the warrantless intrusion." Given the 
three year time span, there was no need for swift ap-
prehension. There were no exigent circumstances. 
Since the defendant's arrest was illegal, his confession 
must be suppressed. Commonwealth v. Williams, 24 
Crim. L. Rep. 2241 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1978). 
"Farce and Mockery" Standard Rejected 
The defendant petitioned for habeas corpus relief, 
claiming that he did not have effective assistance of 
counsel. His petition was dismissed by the District 
Court on the ground that the cited acts and omissions 
of the attorney were either not prejudicial, or did not 
reduce the defendant's trial to a ·~farce and mockery 
of justice." On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the· 
"farce and mockery" standard, describing it as "out-
moded." The Court held "that the Sixth Amendment 
requires that persons accused of crime be afforded 
reasonably competent and effective representation." 
This test reflects both a higher standard and greater 
objectivity than the prior one. Also, "the accused 
must establish that counsel's errors prejudiced the 
defense." Since no prejudice was evident, the denial 
of relief was affirmed. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 24 Crim. 
L. Rep. 2279 (9th Cir. 1978). 
Conditional Guilty Pleas 
to Preserve Fourth Amendment Issues 
In U.S. v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1975), 
the Third Circuit approved the use of conditional 
guilty pleas "in appropriate circumstances." The trial 
court in the preseritcase relied on that precedent in 
accepting the defendant's conditional guilty plea to 
mail fraud. The defendant \ivas allowed to preserve 
his right to appeal the trial court's refusal to suppress 
evidence obtained in three searches and through elec-
tronic surveillance. In following Zudick, the Third 
Circuit pointed out that in cases where there are no 
questions of fact, there need not be a full trial simply 
to preserve a legal objection. U.S. v. Moskow, 24 
Crim. L. Rep. 2277 (3d Cir. 1978). 
Attorney's Use of·a Fourth Amendment Claim 
Reviewable on Habeas 
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the 
Supreme Court ruled that when a person in state cus-
tody has had a fair hearing on his Fourth Amendment 
claim and lost, he cannot obtain federal habeas corpus 
relief based on that Fourth Amendment claim. The 
Fourth Circuit interpreted Stone in a recent case and 
said, "We do not read it to say that issuance of a writ 
of habeas corpus on sixth amendment grounds is 
barred if a defense attorney fails to object to the ad-
mission of evidence in clear violation of the fourth 
amendment." Thus, the Court allowed federal habeas 
relief where defendant alleged that he had been denied 
effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amend-
ment. Sallie v. North Carolina, 24 Crim. L. Rep. 2281 
(4th Cir. 1978). 
Voice Identification line-Up 
The victim and other witnesses identified the de-
fendant as a rapist both at a voice identification line-
up and in court~ The Appellate Court found that the 
identification procedure was tainted and "substantial-
ly likely to cause mis-identification." The Court re-
lied on Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), which 
provided .five factors to be considered in determining 
the admissibility of an out-of-court identification 
where the procedure used created a substantial likeli-
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hood of misidentification. The court must look to 
the totality of the circumstances, Including: "1) the 
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the· 
time of the crime; 2) the witness' degree of attention; 
3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description; 4} 
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at 
the identification procedure; and 5) the length of 
time between the crime and the identification pro-
cedure." Under the circumstances in this case- the 
six and a half month time span between the rape and 
the line-up, the brevity of the victim's contact with 
the rapist, her inability to identify the defendant at 
the time of the rape"despite her prior acquaintance 
with him, the suspicions she and the other witnesses 
had of the defendant, and the fact that she knew the 
defendant was charged with the rape- the Court · 
found the line-up was improper. Carter v. State, 24 
Crim. L. Rep. 2114 (Fla. Ct. App.2d Dist. 1978). 
Stops- Lineups 
The defendant was justifiably stopped by police 
under Terry. However, his detention for 20 minutes 
while the officers checked the area to see if any 
crimes had been committed could not be justified "as 
it was completely unrelated to the initial interference 
by the officers . . . . The scope of the pol ice power to 
detain must be related to the justification for the stop 
at its inception- not to an after-found justification." 
During the illegal detention, the officers discovered 
that the defendant was wanted for armed robbery. 
They arrested him and found evidence linking him to 
the crime. He was then taken to the scene of the crime 
a_nd identifie? by the vi_cti~_. The Court hel~·that ,, 
smce the pol1ce had a s1gmftcant amount of mforma- ·.f:l 
tion linking the defendant to the crime, he was more 
than a potential suspect. Therefore, there was no 
need for an at-the-scene identification. The defendant 
should have been taken to the police station a~ pro-
vided a line-up and counsel. A new trial was granted, 
and the suppression of evidence seized as a result of 
the illegal detention and evidence of the at-the-scene 
identification was ordered. People v. Dixon, 24 Crim. 
L. Rep. 2225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978). 
Fourth Amendment Rights of Probationers 
Based on an anonymous phone tip that defendant 
was dealing in drugs, his probation officer conducted 
a search of his person and automobile. A small hand-
gun was discovered which resulted in the revocation 
of his probation and conviction for possession of a 
dangerous weapon. The New York Court of Appeals 
reversed, ruling that probationers have Fourth 
Amendment rights. The Court did condition its rul-. 
ing, however, by saying, "[o] f course the defendant's 
status as a parolee or probationer is relevant in deter-
mining the reasonableness of the search." People v. 
jackson, 24 Crim. L. Rep. 2318 (N.Y. Ct. App 1978). 
